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CHANGING I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A): FOR ART'S SAKE
Under current tax law, artists making charitable donations of their work are al-
lowed a deduction equal only to the cost of the materials used Art collectors, how-
ever, may take a deduction equal to the fair market value of any piece donated.
Exacerbating this inequitable situation is the fact that an artist's estate is taxed on the
fair market value, rather than material cost, of artwork still in his possession at the
time of his death. This Note examines the relevant federal income and estate tax
provisions in light of their detrimental effect on the donation of original works of art,
and concludes that the income tax laws should be modified.
INTRODUCTION
ART IS EVERYWHERE. We are exposed to it in many forms,
from literature to music to the visual arts. Means of financing it
are equally diverse, encompassing both public and private backing.
Depending on the country, the proportion of individual to govern-
ment assistance varies, but art is generally considered beneficial to
society and worthy of support.'
In this country, an avenue of support once available for the arts
was the ability of artists2 to deduct from their taxable income the
full fair market value of any contribution of their artwork. The ef-
fect of allowing such a deduction was to provide an incentive for
artists to donate their work to museums, enabling these institutions
to develop their collections. In 1969, however, this incentive was
virtually eliminated as a result of legislation passed partially in reac-
tion to President Nixon's large federal tax deduction for the dona-
tion of his vice presidential papers.3 Since the enactment of the Tax
Reform Act of 19691 an artist can no longer deduct the fair market
value of his own work upon its donation to a museum or other char-
itable organization. He is only permitted to deduct what amounts
to his material costs.5
The effect of the Act on America's museums and other cultural
institutions has been staggering. By allowing a charitable contribu-
tion tax deduction only for art materials such as paint and canvas,
but not for the creative part of the artist's work, this law has re-
1. See Paying for the Arts, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 1984.
2. The term "artist" in this paper will refer to the combined group of artists, compos-
ers, and authors.
3. See infra note 39.
4. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
5. See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
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suited in a dearth of artist contributions.6 The irony in the govern-
ment's change of position is that only four years earlier, in 1965,
when creating the National Endowment for the Arts, Congress'
stance was that "it is necessary and appropriate for the Federal
Government to help create and sustain not only a climate encourag-
ing freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry but also the ma-
terial conditions facilitating the release of this creative talent .... ,,7
In addition to its adverse effects on the contribution of art to
museums, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 works unfairness by dis-
criminating against the artist as a taxpayer. The inequities manifest
themselves in two areas. First, the 1969 tax gives art collectors
much more favorable treatment than it gives the artists themselves.8
If an artist donates a self-created piece, he can only deduct material
cost. The collector, however, is allowed to deduct the full fair mar-
ket value of any art work donated to a qualified charitable organiza-
tion.9 Second, upon the artist's death, his estate will be taxed not at
material cost, which would make the valuation procedure consis-
tent, but upon the fair market value of the works of art still in his
possession. 10
Part I of this Note will examine how the federal income and
estate tax laws treat the artist, illustrating how the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 forces the artist to deduct a lower value for the donation of
a self-created work than may a collector contributing the identical
piece." Parts II and III will discuss why the 1969 Act was passed
and emphasize that the reasons for the enactment are no longer
valid. 1
2
Part IV of this Note will analyze the pros and cons of altering
either the estate or income tax laws, concluding that modification of
the latter is preferable.13 Part V will focus on attempts by Congress
to eliminate the inequities of the 1969 Act.14 Included will be the
6. See infra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
7. National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 951(5)
(1982).
8. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
9. The charitable contribution has existed in one form or another since 1917 when
created by the War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300 (1917) (current
version at I.R.C. § 170). The wartime tax rates were high, and out of fear that the increased
rates would reduce charitable contributions, the deduction was enacted. See 55 CONG. REC.
6728-29 (1917).
10. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 39-96 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 97-179 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
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author's proposals for changes that should accompany any legisla-
tion that is passed. 15 Finally, this Note will conclude that a change
in the federal income tax laws to allow an artist a fair market value
deduction for the contribution of his own artwork is necessary.
Such a modification is required to effectuate the Internal Revenue
Code's goal of horizontal equity, 16 and will also provide the neces-
sary incentive for artists to make charitable donations, thereby re-
viving the flow of art into our nation's museums.
I. TAX TREATMENT OF THE ARTIST
Artists, like other individuals, are subject to paying income
taxes. The artist may realize income either through the sale of his
work or as fees, salaries, wages, or commissions paid to him for his
services. 7 The gross income realized by an artist after the creation
and sale of his work will almost always be ordinary income. 8 Once
the artist determines his ordinary income, it is taxed under the same
progressive rate schedule applicable to other taxpayers, whereby the
tax rate increases in correlation with the amount of income
earned.' 9
Rather than selling his works, an artist may donate them to a
museum. Since 1917, all taxpayers, including artists, have been able
to reduce gross income by the amount of a gift made to qualified
charitable organizations.2" Thus, prior to the 1969 Act, an artist's
charitable contribution of his work was thrice blessed:
15. See infra notes 188-210 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 32.
17. VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS, THE VISUAL ARTIST & THE LAW 42-43
(1974). See also W. Joseph, Income Taxation, Record Keeping, Reporting, Forms of Doing
Business and Estate Planning Consideration 2 (October 25, 1980) (unpublished speech before
the Ohio Art Law Association's 1980 Art Law Conference) (a discussion of the different
sources of income to the artist) [hereinafter Joseph Speech]. For an analysis of what consti-
tutes income to an artist, see Tobey v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 227 (1973). Although Tobey is
concerned with the income earned abroad, the definition of earned income for domestic gains
is the same. L. DuBoFF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 63 (1977).
18. I.R.C. § 64 (1982). The artist determines the amount of gain from the sale or ex-
change of his work by subtracting the cost of materials from the price received. See I.R.C.
§§ 1001, 1011, 1012 (1982).
19. I.R.C. § 1 (1982). "Under a progressive tax system, the tax value of any deduction
or exclusion increases as the marginal tax rates increase, so that preferences (that are not in
the form of tax credits) are most valuable to those with the highest incomes." J. PECHMAN,
FEDERAL TAX POLICY 74 (4th ed. 1983).
20. I.R.C. § 170 (1982). See Note, Tax Treatment of Artists' Charitable Contributions,
89 YALE L.J. 144, 145 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Tax Treatment]; Note, Tax Incentivesfor
Support of the Arts: In Defense of the Charitable Deduction, 85 DICK. L. REv. 663, 666 n.3
(1981) [hereinafter Note, Tax Incentives].
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He realized no income either on the contribution or a later dispo-
sition by the donee; he was entitled to a charitable deduction
from ordinary income equal to the fair market value of the work
transferred; and, if the work had been created in a prior taxable
year, his charitable deduction was not reduced on account of the
costs of production previously deducted as business expenses.
2 1
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 ended this favorable situation by
limiting the deduction for the donation of self-created work to its
material costs. 2 2 The most critical change was the addition of sec-
tion 170(e)(1)(A),23 which provided that a charitable deduction
must be decreased by the amount which would have been ordinary
gain had the artist instead sold his creation. 24 Since artwork is ordi-
nary income property,25 and the artist's sale of his own work would
give rise to ordinary gain, the artist may deduct only his adjusted
basis in the item, which is essentially the cost of his material.26
Artists' creations have been accorded ordinary property treat-
ment since Congress enacted section 1221(3)(A) in 1950.' 7 Prior to
that time, self-created works of art were treated as capital assets.28
If that were presently the case, artists would still deduct fair market
value. Today, however, because artists' works are not characterized
as capital assets,29 it is difficult for the artist to avoid the application
of section 170(e)(1)(A) and thus garner any tax advantage from the
21. Beghe, The Artist, the Art Market and the Income Tax, 29 TAX L. REv. 491, 514
(1974).
22. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80-82, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2109-111; see also Beghe, supra note 21, at 515-16 (history of
legislation leading up to the Tax Reform Act of 1969).
23. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a)(1)(B), 83 Stat. 487, 549
(codified at I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A) (1982)). This section provides that "[tihe amount of any
charitable contribution of property ... shall be reduced... by the amount of gain which
would not have been long-term capital gain if the property contributed had been sold by the
taxpayer at its fair market value (determined at the time of such contribution) .... " Id.
24. Feld, Artists, Art Collectors and Income Tax, 60 B.U.L. REv. 625, 656 (1980).
25. "The term 'ordinary income' includes any gain from the sale or exchange of prop-
erty which is... [not] a capital asset. . . ." I.R.C. § 64 (1982). Ordinary income property
includes all assets which, if sold at the time of contribution to charity, would generate ordi-
nary income and not long-term capital gains. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b)(1). Examples of
ordinary income property include merchandise inventory, depreciable property, and a work
of art held by the taxpayer who created it.
26. See supra note 18.
27. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 210(a), 64 Stat. 906, 933 (codified as amended at
I.RC. § 1221(3)(A) (1982)). "mhe term 'capital asset' means property held by the taxpayer
.. , but does not include.., a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter
or memorandum, or similar property, held by... a taxpayer whose personal efforts created
such property .... " I.R.C. § 1221(3)(A) (1982).
28. For a history of I.R.C. § 1221(3), see 2 B. BrTTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF IN-
COME, ESTATES AND GiFrs 51-34 to 51-39 (1981); Feld, supra note 24, at 628 & n.24.
29. See supra note 27.
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charitable donation of his work.3 °
The hardship generated by this characterization is magnified
when one considers the treatment of an art collector's charitable
contribution of a work. The collector is able to deduct the full fair
market value of a work he donates,31 even if it is identical to a piece
for which the artist can deduct only material cost. Assuming the
collector is not buying or selling art on a regular basis so as to war-
rant trade or business treatment, his art collection is treated as an
investment and is properly given capital asset status.32 Thus, a non-
artist individual's charitable donation of appreciated property33
held for over six months is not subject to the restrictions of section
170(e)(1)(A).34 The art collector is allowed a full fair market value
deduction, even for the amount of appreciation over his purchase
price, which is never taxed.
Another major inconsistency inherent in the system becomes ap-
parent when one compares the treatment of artists for estate tax
versus income tax purposes. According to estate tax provisions,
self-created works remaining in the artist's estate at the time of his
30. See Feld, supra note 24, at 656-57. Two possibilities for avoiding ordinary property
treatment are suggested. One is for the artist to sell his work to a spouse or relative in an
arm's-length transaction. A family member would thus take the art as a capital asset, and
any charitable donation of the item would be deductible at its fair market value.
Another possibility is through a like-kind exchange under I.R.C. § 1031. If the artist can
prove that he exchanged his work for like-kind property and that he held both the work
exchanged and the like-kind property received for investment purposes, he would qualify for
§ 1031 non-recognition of gain. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b) (1982). If the artist can
meet these statutory requirements, not only is there deferral of tax on any gain, but the new
work can have capital asset status as well. He then would be entitled to a fair market value
deduction upon donation, if the work is held for six months or longer, thus resulting in
permanent non-recognition of the realized gain. A court might easily rule against like-kind
exchange treatment since it undercuts the purpose of I.R.C. § 1221(3), in that the increment
representing the artist's services will never be taxed at ordinary income rates. Feld, supra
note 24, at 657.
31. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c)(1) (1982). There are, however, limitations on the ag-
gregate of contribution deductions in a taxable year determined by a percentage of the tax-
payer's contribution base. I.R.C. § 170(b) (1982). See Levun, Charitable Contributions of
Works ofArt and Other Property: An Analysis of Federal Income Tax Considerations, 68 ILL.
B.J. 604, 608 & nn.19, 20 (1980).
32. If the collector is actively buying and selling art work, his collection could be char-
acterized as "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business." This is one of the exceptions to capital asset property.
I.R.C. § 1221(1) (1982). Thus, the collector's contribution would be considered a donation of
ordinary income property. See also Treas. Reg., supra note 25 (an example of ordinary prop-
erty is property held by the donor primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
business).
33. The term appreciated property refers to any tangible or intangible property that has
a fair market value in excess of its cost. BLACK'S LAW DCTIONARY 92 (5th ed. 1979).
34. See Feld, supra note 24, at 650 n.131.
[Vol. 37:536
FOR ART'S SAKE
death are not valued at material cost, as tax symmetry would dic-
tate, but rather are assessed at fair market value.35 The federal es-
tate tax provisions allow deductions for gifts to certain charitable
organizations, at which point the estate may deduct the full fair
market value,36 but this seems to be an inefficient means of employ-
ing assets.3 7 It seems ludicrous to require a museum or similar in-
stitution to wait until an artist has died before it receives the work
that he wanted to donate while living but was unable to because of
his inability to deduct more than a miniscule fraction of its value.
There are gross inequities in the deduction value allowed for a
donation of artwork. Not only are different standards applied to
artists and art collectors, but different valuations are used for in-
come and estate tax purposes as well. While one of the Internal
Revenue Code's goals is horizontal equity,38 it fails to reach that
objective in its treatment of the artist.
35. I.RtC. § 2031 (1982). "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be deter-
mined by including... the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated." Id. § 2031(a).
36. See id §§ 2055, 2522 (1982). "For purposes of the [estate] tax imposed by section
2001, the value of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the
gross estate the amount of all bequests... to or for the use of any ... charitable [purposes]
.... Id. § 2055(a)(2).
For a more detailed discussion of estate charitable deductions under § 2055, see Bateman
& Kligman, Estate Charitable Deductions Under Section 2055, 26 PRAC. LAW. 71 (1980).
37. This "lock-in" effect is caused by the provisions of I.R.C. § 1014, dealing with the
basis of property acquired from a decedent. The basis of inherited property is generally its
fair market value at the time of the owner's death. I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (1982). Thus, the
basis of property left by an artist will be stepped up, and the amount of the step up will not be
subject to income tax. As a result of § 1014, assets might not be used in the most effective
manner. For example, an artist may hold on to the art he wants to donate to a museum and
have his estate donate it at his death. Since the estate takes the painting with a stepped-up
basis, it gets a fair market value deduction, whereas the artist would have received only a
material cost deduction. Opponents, however, will argue that few artists fall into this cate-
gory. They would contend that the artist sells or donates his works for reasons other than the
transaction's tax consequence. See infra note 97.
Congress has taken an unfavorable view of the argument that § 1014 discourages the
efficient use of assets. In 1976, after many years of urging by the Treasury, Congress at-
tempted to change § 1014. Under newly enacted § 1023, property acquired by inheritence
would no longer take a fair market value basis but would take a carryover basis. M. CHIREL-
STEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 58 (1971). Under this new provision, selective transfer
of assets would no longer be necessary, and efficient use of assets would be encouraged.
Section 1023's life was short, however; indeed, it was never even born. Criticized for its
technical defects, the effective date of the section was continually pushed back. Finally, in
1980, § 1023 was withdrawn completely and § 1014 was back in force. M. CHIRELSTEIN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 60 (4th ed. 1985).
38. J. PECHMAN, supra note 19, at 5. "Horizontal equity encompasses the principle that
taxpayers with equal [circumstances] ... should pay the same tax." Id
1987]
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II. REASONS FOR THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969
Congress's dissatisfaction in several areas led to the changes
contained in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. President Nixon's sub-
stantial deduction for the donation of his vice presidential papers
certainly was influential, 39 but two other factors also contributed
significantly to the change. First, Congress was concerned with the
abuses prevalent in the valuation of donated art items;' second, it
was disturbed that an artist could benefit more by donating his crea-
tion than by selling it.41
Works of art are difficult to value, and Congress was ever fearful
of fraudulent valuations and the subsequent loss of income to the
government coffers.42 In a committee hearing, Congressman Wil-
bur Mills testified that "Paintings and other art objects are very
hard to value. As a result, very high values are placed on paintings
which cost the person very little. Who is to say how much a paint-
ing is really worth?"4 3
The 1969 tax change was also responsive to congressional appre-
hension over providing a greater tax advantage for the donation of
appreciated property than for its sale.' Prior to the 1969 change, if
an artist created a work costing him $100 for materials, paid in af-
ter-tax dollars, and donated it to a museum a year later when it was
worth $1100, he could deduct the full $1100 as a charitable contri-
bution. His tax bill would benefit by the $1000 in realized gain that
he was not required to recognize as income. Although the artist
lost the opportunity to sell the painting and profit by the gain, he
39. See S. REP. No. 768, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10; H.R. REP. No. 966, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 10.
40. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 55, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1701.
41. Id. at 53-55, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1699-1701; S.
REP. No. 552, supra note 23, at 80-82, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2109-10. A parallel concern of Congress was appreciation in value that escaped taxation
upon donation of the item. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
42. The higher the appraised value, the greater the deduction from the taxpayer's gross
income. The resulting reduced tax bill lowers the individual's payment to the government.
43. 115 CONG. REC. 22,571 (1969) (statement of Rep. Mills). One confusing aspect of
the valuation concern is that price appraisals are a problem with all art, whether donated by
an artist or collector. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 changes, however, affect only the artist, by
erasing the special tax advantages for gifts of creator-held property. "[I]dentical benefits for
contributors of other types of appreciated property were either limited less severely-in the
case of unrelated-use tangible personal property-or left intact-in the case of real, intangible
personal, and related-use tangible personal property." Note, Tax Treatment, supra note 20,
at 147 n.12.
44. H.R. REP. No. 413, supra note 40, at 53-56; S. REP. No. 552, supra note 22, at 80-
[V/ol. 37:536
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nevertheless had an advantage over the person who made a $1100
cash donation totally from after-tax dollars.45
All of these factors fueled a congressional response which mani-
fested itself in the Tax Reform Act of 1969.46 Charitable contribu-
tions by an artist now generate a deduction equal only to the artist's
adjusted basis.47 Thus, as far as the artist is concerned, the effect of
the 1969 tax change was to limit the amount of the available deduc-
tion to the cost of materials used to create the work.48
III. WHY ACTION MUST BE TAKEN
A. The Correction of Past Abuses
While the deductions taken for donation of papers by public offi-
cials,49 the problem of valuation abuses, 0 and the possibility of ben-
45. Note, Tax Incentives, supra note 20, at 667 & n.19.
In 1969, the highest tax bracket was 70 percent with a capital gains deduction of 50
percent. IL Assuming the artist is in the highest bracket, he would garner $1000 in long-
term capital gains if he sold the work after a year. His tax would be $500, and thus his tax
benefit would also be $500. If he contributed the identical piece, the artist would be able to
deduct the full fair market value of $1100. This donation would yield a tax benefit of $770
(70 percent of $1100), and thus an advantage of $270. See also Note, Tax Treatment, supra
note 20, at 145-46 & n.7 (detailed mathematical explanation of the above analysis).
46. See supra note 4.
47. Adjusted basis, from which the computation of gain or loss is determined upon dis-
position of the property, is equal to the cost of the property and any adjustments delineated in
I.R.C. § 1016. See I.R.C. § 1012 (1982).
48. This limitation on deductions for contributions by artists of self-created works
presents a genuine hardship since, typically, the ratio of cost to market value for creative
compositions is very high.
A good example-although perhaps a somewhat exaggerated one only because of
the excellence and the reputation of the artist- would be Jasper Johns.... If he
were to sell a painting from say, $25,000 anywhere up to a massive work which
could cost $250,000 to a collector [(recent Jasper Johns originals have gone for over
one million dollars)] and the collector in turn, were to give that work to a museum,
the collector could deduct, for income tax purposes, up to the fair market value of
the work....
However, if Jasper Johns, as creator of the work were to contribute the exact
same painting to a museum, he could deduct only the cost of the materials involved
in making the work, which would probably run somewhere around $45.
Public Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6022 (1973) (statement of John B. Hightower, President, Associated
Councils of the Arts) [hereinafter 1973 Hearings].
See also id. at 6118 (statement of Elias Newman, President, Artists Equity Association of
New York, estimating the cost of a Rembrandt ink drawing at four cents); id at 6130 (testi-
mony of Elias Newman stating that the manuscripts of composer Igor Stravinsky, worth $3.5
million, would only yield a deduction equivalent to the cost of pen, paper, and ink if Mr.
Stravinsky were to donate them).
49. The 1969 Act was enacted to deal with, among other things, the sizable and unpopu-
lar deductions taken for donations of papers by public officials. "Dear Colleague" Letter of
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efiting more from a contribution than from an outright sale5' were
salient problems in the 1960's, measures have been and are being
taken to alleviate them. New concerns, however, have arisen in
their place, including the virtual cessation of artist contributions to
museums52 and the stagnation of government support of the arts. 3
One of the driving forces behind the Tax Reform Act of 1969
was the excessive deductions taken by government officials for the
donation of their papers.54 Legislators are cognizant of these past
abuses, however, and have proposed bills which would enable art-
ists to receive full fair market deduction value, while explicitly
prohibiting these deductions by public servants.55
Another motivation behind the 1969 changes was anxiety over
the pervasive abuses in valuing art. That problems arise is not sur-
prising, because assigning a value to a piece of art is inevitably a
subjective process. The uniqueness of each work makes it extremely
difficult to determine a true fair market value. 6 In the absence of a
recent cash sale, experts are forced to determine an object's value
using other, more judgmental techniques.57 Difficulties are inherent
Congressman Thomas J. Downey (N.Y.) to fellow Congressmen (Jan. 31, 1983) [hereinafter
"Dear Colleague" Letter] (available from Congressman Downey's office).
50. See supra note 40; see also Hilla Rebay v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 181
(1963) This overevaluation case exemplifies the situation with which Congress seemed to be
concerned when it revised the Code in 1969. In this case, the Commissioner disallowed, in
whole or in part, deductions claimed for the donation of self-created works of art. The deci-
sion was based solely on disagreement with the fair market value figure used by the taxpayer
at the time of his contribution.
51. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
52. See infra note 78. This consequence of the 1969 Act is not surprising. In fact, the
Senate version of the bill deleted the House provisions reducing the allowable deduction for
artists' contributions. The Senate justified the deletion by pointing to the provision's poten-
tially "adverse impact on charitable giving to public charities .... " The House provisions,
however, were incorporated into the final version. S. REP. No. 552, supra note 22, at 82,
reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2111.
53. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
55. See infra note 185-87 and accompanying text.
56. Fair market is defined as "the price at which the property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or
sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-
l(c)(2) (1982). For a good overview of valuation problems and questions, see Melevin, Valu-
ation of Charitable Contributions of Works of Art, 60 TAXES 756 (1982); see also Note, Tax
Incentives, supra note 20, at 670-77 (illustrating the acute difficulties in valuing unique pieces
of art).
57. The IRS tries to provide some guidelines for determining fair market value. The
factors it considers are cost of donated property, replacement cost, sale of similar property,
and appraisal value by an expert. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Basis of Assets 551
(1985); see also Feld, supra note 24, at 650 (detailing some of the difficulties involved in
obtaining an accurate fair market value).
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because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) requires an objective
measurement of the value of a piece of art.58
In order to counteract this problem and in response to the grow-
ing need for uniformity and fairness, the IRS created the Arts Advi-
sory Panel in 1968.19 The panel is comprised of art experts from
major segments of the art world-museums, universities, and deal-
ers-and its purpose is to determine the accuracy of privately ob-
tained appraisals.' Since its inception, the panel has been
increasingly successful in stemming valuation abuses and, arguably,
may deter other potential abusers.61
In addition to establishing the Arts Advisory Panel, the IRS, on
the recommendation of Congress, 62 has refined the valuation pro-
cess. New Revenue Procedures list acceptable appraisal methods. 3
58. Melevin, supra note 56, at 756. Adding to this confusion, the courts have developed
their own valuation methods. Judicial decisions emphasize the individual nature of each
value determination. See, eg., Ansehno v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1985)
(loose gems donated by a taxpayer to a museum must be valued with reference to the market-
place in which jewelry manufacturers buy such gems in bulk, not retail jewelry stores); John
W. Pearsall, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 956 (1977) (Tax Court ruling on the valuation of houses
donated by the taxpayer when no willing buyer existed).
59. See I.R.S. News Release, 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCII) § 6573 (Feb. 1, 1968). The
panel will determine if the valuation is either clearly justified, questionable, or clearly unjusti-
fied. The panel will also recommend the names of appraisers. a
60. Generally, if a particular item has a value over $5000 (this figure was recently low-
ered from $20,000), the Art Panel will probably review the valuation. (This does not mean
that objects under this amount will not be examined, but it will be done at the local I.R.S.
office. If however, the office needs the Panel's expertise, the valuation can be sent for review.)
The Panel's decision is technically only advisory, but I.R.S. district offices consider them
binding. Lerner, Valuation Issues Predominate when Clients Want To Keep Collections in the
Family, I1 Esr. PLANNING 90, 91-92 (1984).
61. In 1978, the panel reviewed 702 works of art. Taxpayers' claimed values were ad-
justed by $12 million. In ten years of operation, the panel has reviewed appraisals with a
total claimed value of $276 million and has made adjustments of $75 million. 1978 I.R.S.
ANN. REP. 49. See also 122 CONG. REc. 23, 359-360 (1976) (statement of Senator Javits,
claiming that valuation is no longer a problem). But see Speiller, The Favored Tax Treatment
of Purchasers of Art, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 214, 236 & n.87 (1980).
62.
[Tihe [Finance] [C]ommittee believes that the serious problems of valuation of gifts
of tangible personal property would still remain even if the appreciation were to be
taken into account for tax purposes, and that a more desirable method of control-
ling overvaluations is for the Internal Revenue Service to strengthen its audit proce-
dures for reviewing the value claimed on such gifts.
S. REP. No. 552, supra note 22, at 82, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2111.
63. Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257. When an appraiser tries to value a unique col-
lection, a retail market might not exist. The I.R.S. procedures provide that an appraisal
should include: a complete description of the object; its cost, date, and manner of acquisition;
a history of the item, including authenticity; a photograpgh of the item; and a statement of
the factors upon which the appraisal was based. The factors might include the following: any
sales of other works by the same artist, especially if near the valuation date; prices quoted in
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The IRS's primary attack centered on the appraisal's credibility and
objectivity, as well as the ability of the appraisers themselves.' 4 Ap-
praisers must now be licensed, as are attorneys and accountants tes-
tifying before the IRS.65  Additionally, the IRS can take action
against the appraiser for inaccurate work; possible sanctions include
disqualification from future appraisals 66 and assessment of mone-
tary fines. 67  Thus, while donors previously were not required to
obtain an appraisal to document the fair market value of their
donated work,68 strictly regulated substantiation requirements are
now in force. With these appraisal regulations and the successful
emergence of the Arts Advisory Panel, the IRS has made great
strides in combating valuation abuse.69
The final concern precipitating the 1969 tax changes, the possi-
bility of benefiting more from a contribution than sale of an item,
has since become moot. Because the Tax Reform Act of 198670
eliminates the capital gains taxation rate, the possibility of profiting
dealers' catalogs of the artist's works; a statement of market conditions; a record of any
exhibition at which the particular artist was displayed; and a statement as to the standing of
the artist in his profession. Id For life-time gifts made to charity after 1984, even more
detailed substantiation is required. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13T (1984).
64. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 155(a)(3)-§ 155(a)(5), 98 Stat.
494, 691-92. The Act requires the Treasury to issue regulations describing the procedures for
valuation and requiring qualified appraisals if the item is over $5000 and is not publicly
traded stock. Id. at 691. The IRS, however, is not required to accept appraisals merely
because they were prepared by experts. Not all appraisers are experts on all forms of art. It
is now necessary to have an expert qualified in evaluating the specific type of art one is donat-
ing. Wittenbach & Milani, Charting the Current Rules on Charitable Contributions, 63
TAXES 541, 550 (1985).
65. Appraiser Sanctions Clarified in Prop. Regs., 62 J. TAX'N 305 (1985) [hereinafter
Appraiser Sanctions].
66. Regulations which became effective February 20, 1985, (pursuant to Deficit Reduc-
tion Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 156, 98 Stat. 494, 695), bar any individual against
whom a penalty has been assessed for aiding and abetting an understatement of tax from
appearing before the IRS for purposes of offering evidence as an appraiser. Additionally, the
IRS's Director of Practice may either reprimand the appraiser or disqualify him from partici-
pating in IRS proceedings. Appraiser Sanctions, supra note 65, at 305.
67. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13T(c)(5)(i)(D) (1984).
68. Wittenbach & Milani, supra note 64, at 549.
69. It is not contended that taxpayers are submitting perfect evaluations, but the IRS
now has an effective procedure to attack valuation abuses and to make adjustments. The Arts
Advisory Panel reports that in 1983, nearly three quarters of the donors of expensive artwork
who claimed deductions overvalued their deductions an average of 10.17 percent. See Non-
Profit Organization Tax Letter 2 (Mar. 22, 1985). Contrast this figure with the 29 percent
valuation discrepancy in the panel's first five years of operations. See 1978 I.R.S. ANN. REP.
18.
70. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. - 1986 (repealing I.R.C.
§ 1202).
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through donations has disappeared.71 Thus, Congress need no
longer concern itself with this past unfair result.
B. The Emergence of New Concerns
1. Museums
In addition to eliminating the prior justifications for the 1969
changes, the tax code should be altered to curb the undesirable ef-
fects it has on our cultural institutions. Since 1969, the tax law
changes have severely limited the ability of museums to make vital
acquisitions.72 Instead, works of art are sold to private collectors
who take them into their homes and often out of the country.73
Museums in America largely depend upon private support for
their existence,74 since their acquisition budgets cannot compete
with private money. Larry Reiger, director of the American Asso-
ciation of Museums in Washington, D.C., estimates that 80 percent
of all works acquired by museums are donated.7" At present, the
vast majority of a museum's funds are used to meet operating ex-
penses.76 Thus, growth potential is almost nonexistent unless these
71. While the preferential long-term capital gains exclusion has been repealed by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 and is now taxed as ordinary income, characterization of gain as
capital or ordinary and long or short-term is still vital. Long-term capital gains or losses can
be used to offset short-term capital gains or losses. Furthermore, a donation of capital gain
property still yields a deduction at fair market value.
The one effect that the 1986 Act has on the donation of appreciated capital gain property
is that the appreciation is now a tax preference subject to the alternative minimum tax. See
I.R.C. § 57(a)(6) (1986). If the artist is forced to calculate taxes using this alternative, then
his charitable deduction calculation will be similar to that of an artist donating his own
works. In 1983, however, only "12.6 percent of the taxpayers with [adjusted gross income] of
$200,000 and over were subject to the alternative minimum tax. Under the new law it is
expected that even fewer taxpayers will be subject to the alternative minimum tax." TAX
NoTs, Oct. 20, 1986, at 288.
72. "Dear Colleague" Letter, supra note 49.
73. News release of Congressman Thomas J. Downey (N.Y.) (Mar. 2, 1983) (available
from Congressman Downey's office). "European and Japanese collectors and museums are
now outbidding one another for works by our American artists, paying fantastic prices for
work by artists who just a few years ago were amongst those who gave their works as gifts to
museums .... 1973 Hearings, supra note 48, at 6120 (testimony of Elias Newman, President
of the Artists Equity Association of New York and Chairman of the Conference of American
Artists).
See also 1973 Hearings, supra note 48, at 6144 (letter of John I.H. Baur, Director,
Whitney Museum of American Art) ("Already buyers in Europe and Japan, drawn by the
preeminent position of contemporary American art, have bought many major works for their
own museums and private collections.").
74. 115 CONG. Rac. 22738 (1969) (letter of Dr. Sherman Lee, Director, Cleveland Mu-
seum of Art).
75. Generosity Will Cost More, LR.S. Tells Donors, ARTNEws, March 1985, at 25.
76. "Caught in an economic squeeze created by their very success and the unprece-
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institutions can acquire their collections through donations.7
The 1969 changes in the tax law are clearly the major cause for
the decline in artist donations. Since their enactment, donations of
self-created artistic, literary, and musical works to museums and
libraries have virtually ceased. 78  The only recourse available to art-
ists to protest the changes was to stop donating their works,79 a
tactic they seem to have adopted enthusiastically. For example, in
the three years immediately preceding the tax change, the Museum
of Modem Art in New York received 321 paintings, sculptures,
drawings, and prints donated by ninety-seven artists. In the three
years following, donations dwindled to twenty-eight works from fif-
teen artists, and those works consisted primarily of prints.80
The largest library in the world, the Library of Congress, owes
its preeminence to its ability to seek and acquire donations.8' In
fact, the growth of collections of American museums in general has
directly resulted from tax incentives which stimulate contribu-
tions.8 2 Under the present law, however, the incentives for donat-
ing have disappeared. Artists are instead motivated to sell to the
highest bidder, even if they are thereby required to break up a col-
dented demands of the public, museums like ours have been forced to spend all their un-
restricted funds on keeping their doors open and their programs going-and even so are
incurring operating deficits." 1973 Hearings, supra note 48, at 6144 (letter of John Baur).
77. 115 CONG. REc. 22,738 (1969) (letter of Thomas P.F. Hoving, Director, Metropoli-
tan Museum of Art, New York).
See also 1973 Hearings, supra note 48, at 6144 (letter of John Baur) (If museums "are to
succeed in their mission, gifts from artists are an absolutely vital source.").
78. Conversation with Dr. Evan Turner, Director, Cleveland Museum of Art (Feb. 15,
1986) [hereinafter Turner Interview]. Dr. Turner said that donations to the Cleveland Mu-
seum have dried up completely.
79. VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS, supra note 17, at 81 n.144 ("The only an-
swer the artist can give to this demeaning law is to stop contributing works to all institutions!")
(quoting Artist's Equity Newsletter (October 1970)) (emphasis in original).
80. 1973 Hearings, supra note 48, at 6143 (letter of Richard E. Oldenburg, Director,
Museum of Modern Art, New York). The 1973 Hearings contain much testimony illustrat-
ing the dramatic effects of the 1969 tax changes in reducing donations of art to museums.
The Library of Congress' Music Division, which received 1200 original manuscripts from
living composers between 1963 and 1970, has received only 30 since that time. The Library's
Manuscript Division was receiving approximately 200,000 manuscript collections each year,
but since 1969, it has received only one major gift of self-created material by a living author.
Additional Estate and Gift Tax Issues: Hearings Before the Subcommitte on Estate and Gift
Taxation, Senate Committee on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 316 (1981) [hereinafter 1981
Hearings] (testimony of Daniel J. Boorstin, Librarian of Congress).
Another case in point is the Library's Prints and Photographs Division, which has also
experienced a precipitous drop in donations since 1969. "Three New Yorker artists have
stopped donating their drawings and cartoons as a direct result of the 1969 act." Id.
81. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 80, at 315.
82. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 48, at 6104.
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lection and sell their works piecemeal. This policy has resulted in
limited public access to the affected works.83
The decline impacts most severely on institutions which special-
ize in original works of contemporary literature, art and music.84
Prior to 1969, many of these institutions had donors who gave on a
continuing basis. Such an arrangement reduced the loss of tax reve-
nue since most donations were made before the works increased in
value.85 It also ensured that works were preserved and made acces-
sible to scholars and the viewing public. This availability is no
longer assured. Now, if the institution is able to obtain any work, it
is through the use of an "on deposit" system which does not actu-
ally transfer title to the institution.8 6 This method of "donation" is
highly unsuccessful because the distinct possibility of removal by
the donor exists, and it is costly to museums to process and main-
tain the works.8 7
2. Government Support
In addition to the declining support from the private sector,
government assistance for the arts has also dwindled. While the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 withdrew contribution incentives from the
private sector, the government at that time responsed to the needs
of our cultural institutions88 and increased its support.89 These gov-
ernment subsidies, however, are no longer prevalent; the Reagan
83. Literary, Musical, and Artistic Donations to Libraries, materials from Congressman
Thomas J. Downey 2 (1983) [hereinafter Downey Material].
84. Those museums with large endowments, such as the J. Paul Getty Museum, or im-
mense collections, such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, are not the ones
most affected. It is the smaller, less established museums in those communities that previ-
ously did not have a museum that are being hurt. ARTNEws, supra note 75, at 25. See also
Interview with Joseph O'Sickey, professional artist and Professor of Art at Kent State Uni-
versity, in Cleveland, Ohio (Nov. 28, 1985) [hereinafter O'Sickey Interview] (reiterating that
smaller museums depend solely on contributions for their existence since their budgets are
not large enough to make these acquisitions).
85. Downey Material, supra note 83, at 1.
86. See 121 CONG. REc. 10,192 (1975).
87. Although institutions do accept works under this arrangement, the practice is unsat-
isfactory. Institutions accept the items hoping they will become outright gifts, but the donor
has the option of withdrawing his work. Such removal of works leaves resources thin and
students upset, and results in a tremendous waste of time and money spent in cataloging,
maintaining, and promoting the collection. Institutions with limited resources can ill afford
to waste money in this manner, yet unless a collection is processed, it is of little value since
scholars will not be aware of its existence. Downey Material, supra note 83, at 1. See also
1981 Hearings, supra note 80, at 316 (withdrawal rights have been exercised, and there is a
mounting threat of further withdrawals if the tax laws remain unchanged).
88.
As we reduce charitable contributions, by making it less attractive for people to
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administration has curbed much of the financial help as well as a
number of special programs.90 In this manner, the government is
forcing art institutions to once again seek help from the private
sector.91
While the climate might have been right in 1969 to check chari-
table contribution abuses, Congress "swung too broad an axe"
when it eliminated the beneficial tax treatment of artists. 92 The sub-
sequent burden placed on artists is unjustified when compared to
the problems created by their contributions. Since the rationale be-
hind the 1969 Act is no longer valid,93 the time is right for changes.
The present decline in donations will continue unabated unless
incentives for giving are implemented. Change is needed to stimu-
late the flow of materials back into our museums, ensuring the pres-
ervation of our cultural heritage. 94  As one expert notes,
give, we again force the recepients to turn to Washington-to get the Federal Gov-
ernment to solve our problems in education, health, and charity.
And so, once again, through changing valid incentives to charitable giving, we
are moving toward reliance on Washington....
We are unquestionably eliminating some tax inequities. But in doing so, we are
forcing private charities and all educational institutions to turn more to the Federal
Government.
115 CONG. Rac. 22,450, 22,582-83 (1969) (statement of George Bush and Rogers Morton).
89. Government appropriations for the arts increased from $7,756,875 in fiscal year
1969 to $60,775,000 in fiscal year 1974. 1985 NAT'L ENDOWMENT ARTS ANN. RaP. 238-39.
See also 1973 Hearings, supra note 48, at 6032 (statement of Congressman Herman T.
Schneebeli). Even amidst the deficit and reduction and elimination of programs, one of the
few areas which showed an increase in the 1974 budget was in the area of the arts.
Centralized government funding for the arts is not an unfamiliar concept. The British
government, for example, handles support for the arts in this manner. Instead of allowing the
individual taxpayer to dictate the flow of money into institutions via the charitable deduction,
full taxes are paid to the government, which then administers the flow of money to the arts
either directly or through its Arts Council. Through central control, institutions are not left
at the mercy of millions of individual taxpayers and much better control is exercised over
dividing the total available funds. See Paying for the Arts, supra note 1.
90. Frank Hodsoll, Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts, states that his
department's budget remains constrained by current and projected federal deficits. In fact,
the appropriations for this major arts funding arm of the government experienced a 4.3%
reduction in funds for fiscal year 1986. 1985 NAT'L ENDOWMENT ARTS ANN. REP., supra
note 89, at 307.
91. President Reagan has asked American corporations and individual citizens to in-
crease their support of charitable organizations since federal programs are being dismantled
or diminished. Wittenbach & Milani, supra note 64, at 541. Recently proposed Treasury
regulations, however, would limit a collector's contribution deduction to the fair market
value of the property or the original purchase price, whichever is smaller. ARTNEws, supra
note 75, at 25.
92. 119 CONG. REC. 9400 (1973) (statement of Senator Frank Church).
93. See supra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
94. Museums fulfill three main functions: they are depositories whose function is to
preserve items of cultural, historical, aesthetic, and educational value; they serve as centers of
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"[r]etaining the flow of valuable objects from private ownership into
the public forum, where they are well cared for and the education
process can continue, is a very valuable and necessary process to
maintain through the future."95 If done properly, the costs to the
government would be minimal and the benefits everlasting.96
IV. WHAT ACTION CAN BE TAKEN
Merely concluding that the tax laws must be changed to achieve
consistency and to increase the flow of natural treasures into our
museums is insufficient. Several possibilities exist to accomplish
this goal, each having advantages and disadvantages. One option is
to change the estate tax laws so that an artist's collection at his
death is valued at material cost instead of fair market value, thus
creating symmetry between the estate and income tax laws. An-
other alternative is to change the income tax laws to provide that an
artist may deduct the fair market value for the donation of his
works, the same value that would apply to a collector's contribution
and one consistent with the level used for estate tax purposes.97
A. Modification of Estate Tax Laws
Presently, when an artist dies, self-created works in his posses-
sion are assessed at fair market value for estate tax purposes.98
Some artists claim that this valuation procedure is where the hard-
research, by encouraging scholars to take advantage of their resources; and they serve as
educational agencies by offering to both interested classes and the general public the opportu-
nity to observe their collections. See A.S. WrrrLiN, MUSEUMS: IN SEARCH OF A USABLE
FUTURE 1 (1970); Note, Tax Incentives, supra note 20, at 701-02.
95. 1973 Hearings, supra note 48, at 6053 (testimony of Kyran M. McGrath, Director,
American Association of Museums).
96. 1973 Hearings, supra note 48, at 6053. Congressman Downey estimates a cost to the
U.S. Treasury of only $5 to 15 million if his legislation to restore deductions for artists'
contributions to fair market value is passed. 131 CONG. REC. E3563 (daily ed. July 26, 1985).
97. Other methods are possible, such as eliminating the charitable contribution alto-
gether, but that issue is beyond the scope of this Note. A thorough examination of this
possibility is contained in McNulty, Public Policy and Private Charity: A Tax Policy Perspec-
tive, 3 VA. TAX REv. 229 (1984).
There is a debate over whether tax incentives are necessary at all to stimulate donations.
Some believe that the tax deduction controls individual motives to give to charity. See Char-
ity Begins at the Movies, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1984, at 23, col. 6. Martin Feldstein and other
economists believe, however, that only about 25 percent of giving is tax induced, while the
rest are made for altruistic or other reasons. Leaders of the charitable community agree with
this perspective, stating that "the tax incentive simply encourages donors to give more at the
margin, so that donations are larger than they would be in the absence of the tax incentive.
See How to Have Donations and a Deductability Limit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1984, at 34, col.
6.
98. See supra note 35; see also VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS, supra note 17, at
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ship lies and that Congress should concern itself with changing this
area of tax law rather than changing the charitable deduction
value.9 9 The artists' grievance centers on a scenario such as the fol-
lowing: An artist creates a painting, which is valued at his material
cost. The artist dies the next day, and the painting is then valued at
the market level. Almost magically, the value of the work has in-
creased substantially overnight. In fact, in protest of the estate tax
laws, a New Mexican artist recently burned his entire collection,
claiming it would be too expensive for him to die." 0
One benefit of changing the estate tax law to a material cost
valuation would be to ease the tax burdens on artists' beneficiaries.
The hardship placed on the artist's estate under the present system
can be tremendous, particularly if family members desire to keep
the works. Unless they have the resources to pay the estate taxes,
which are often quite substantial, the estate will be forced to sell all
or part of the collection to pay off the debt.101 Material cost valua-
tion would enable the estate to decide, without the tax debt being a
major consideration, whether to keep the collection.
Easing difficulties in appraisals is another benefit which could be
realized through altering the tax treatment of an artist's estate."'2
An artist's collection may contain hundreds of works, perhaps in-
cluding a number which are unfinished.' 3 A market probably will
not exist for most of the art, but the estate must nevertheless pay
taxes based on the fair market value of the entire portfolio." 4
47 (discussion of what items are actually included in the estate since the statutory definition
of ownership is imprecise).
99. O'Sickey Interview, supra note 84.
100. Artist Ted DeGrazia, in the early 1980's, burned 100 paintings which he had valued
at $1.5 million, and plans to burn more during his lifetime. See L. DuBoFF, supra note 17, at
660-61.
101. See, e.g., O'Sickey Interview, supra note 84; Joseph Speech, supra note 17, at 37-38;
T. CRAWFORD, LEGAL GUIDE FOR THE VISUAL ARTIST 183 (1975) (discrepency between
the amount of estate taxes owed and available cash can plague estates composed largely of
artworks).
102. Mr. O'Sickey has valued a number of artists' estates while acting as an expert ap-
praiser. He confirms that the process is extremely difficult. Laymen erroneously suppose
that if one work of a particular artist is sold for a certain price, then all his works go up in
price accordingly. In fact, each piece must be individually appraised. Moreover, many other
factors must also be taken into consideration before a fair market value is determined.
O'Sickey Interview, supra note 84. See also Speiller, supra note 61, at 227-28 (discussing the
difficulty of valuing works of art).
103. See O'Sickey Interview, supra note 84.
104. Another problem arises when market forces take over. An artist's death might ini-
tially trigger a rise in the value of his work, but once part of his collection is put on the
market, or after a few of his works are sold, supply and demand factors may drive the market
price down, making it impossible for the estate to realize in cash the fair market value previ-
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Though the artist might have sold only a few works in his lifetime,
an appraiser must determine the collection's value."' 5 The ap-
praiser's task would be significantly easier if he had only to deter-
mine the value of the canvas, paint, and frames.
Allowing material cost valuation for self-created works in an
artist's estate would not only bring estate tax treatment into line
with deductions artists receive for donating items while alive, but
would also rid the estate of the above-mentioned valuation and tax
burden problems. When one considers that even an artist's sketch-
book must be included in the estate at fair market value,10 6 it is
possible to understand why this work might be destroyed,107 result-
ing in the loss of materials valuable to art scholars. 0 8
While artists might argue that the above changes are viable, rea-
sons for retaining the present estate tax system abound. Artists'
estates are presently treated no differently than those of any other
individuals, and to argue for a system that would eliminate this sys-
tem of horizontal equity would defeat the goal of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.
Furthermore, several factors make the present estate tax system
objectively tolerable for artists by allowing them to avoid the harsh
consequences discussed above. Under the current system, an artist
can draft a will which dictates the handling of his possessions at
death. This document will effectuate unified management and con-
ously established. Id. See also Estate of David Smith, 510 F.2d 479, 480 (2d Cir.) (recogniz-
ing that a forced sale of creative property to meet the estate tax bill might depress the value of
the work), cert denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1975).
In addition, great expense might be incurred in the process of selling the works, and this
expense may not be deductible from the estate tax bill. Compare id. at 482-83 (expenses are
deductible only if incurred for the benefit of the estate rather than for the benefit of individual
beneficiaries) with Estate of Park, 475 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1973) (all selling expenses are
deductible).
105. Mr. O'Sickey has had to appraise collections containing hundreds of works by an
artist who had sold only a few items during his lifetime. See O'Sickey Interview, supra note
84.
See also Estate of David Smith, [57-58] Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (P-H) § 57.67 (The case of the
now well-known sculptor who died in 1965 dealt with the valuation process and the possibil-
ity that no significant market for the artist's work existed. In the 25 years before his death,
Smith had sold less than 100 pieces of sculpture, yet 425 works remained in his collection that
had to be valued.); Schaaf, Estate PlanningforAuthors and Artists, 423 Tax Mgmt (BNA), at
A-32 to A-35 (1981) (a detailed analysis of the valuation of assets from an estate tax
perspective).
106. See O'Sickey Interview, supra note 84.
107. Mr. O'Sickey stated that he was considering destroying certain works and his
sketchbooks so as not to saddle his son with a significant debt. Id.
108. Id
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trol1°9 of the artist's works, whereas if he died intestate, the prop-
erty would be divided among distributees depending on the laws of
the state." 0 One of the main benefits of executing a will is that it
allows the artist to specify where the art will go, who is responsible
for paying the taxes and other expenses, and who must care for the
works while they are in the estate and afterwards. 1 '
The will also provides the artist with an opportunity to control
state estate taxes, particularly where the collection is spread among
different states on long-term museum loans. The estate plan can
avoid a myriad of state proceedings by assembling the works in the
area where the artist resides. 1 2 Thus, the artist has the ability to
direct the distribution of his creations through the proper drafting
of his will." 3
In addition, numerous estate planning techniques are available
to alleviate the potentially onerous tax burden facing the artist's
beneficiaries." 4 The gross estate value is reduced by a number of
substantial tax-saving deductions before the total amount of tax due
is determined." 5 The marital deduction" 6 and the charitable de-
109. See Schaaf, supra note 105, at A-30. "[U]nifying management and control of crea-
tive property is to ensure that control is consolidated in the hands of a fiduciary who will not
only protect the interests of the estate and its beneficiaries, but who will have sufficient exper-
tise to exploit the property properly." Id. No matter how good one's estate planning may be,
it still may be necessary to sell some works in order to pay the estate taxes. It is essential to
get a fiduciary who is "versed in the techniques for marketing creative property as will ensure
that it is disposed of at its true market price." Id. at A-31.
I10. See Schaaf, supra note 105, at A-30; Joseph Speech, supra note 17, at 34.
111. Joseph Speech, supra note 17, at 34.
112. T. CRAWFORD, supra note 101, at 178.
113. A will is useful in ensuring the organized handling of an artist's estate, but its use is
not foolproof. See Matter of Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct.
1975), modified 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1976), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d
291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977) (even though the artist had a will to handle his $2 million
estate, mismanagement of the disposition of the artwork led to substantial fiduciary liability).
For a more detailed analysis of the Rothko case, see Feldman, The Rothko Estate: The
Case of the Beleagured Executor, II ART & THE LAW 1 (1976); Harrow, The Final Word in
the Rothko Case: Salient Legal Holdings of the Court of Appeals, IV ART & THE LAW 33
(1978); Harrow, Reflections on Estate of Rothko: The Role of the Legal Advisor in Relation to
the Artist, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573 (1977) [hereinafter Harrow, Reflections].
114. While this Note will not attempt to discuss details of estate planning techniques for
the artist, an overview on the many ways the estate can lessen its tax burdens is appropriate
to counteract the artists' outcry for change. For an overview of the available estate planning
techniques, see Schaaf, supra note 105, at A-13 to A-37.
115. See I.R.C. §§ 2053-2056 (1982).
116. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1983). "For purposes of the [estate] tax imposed.., the value of
the taxable estate shall.., be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate an
amount equal to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from the
decedent to his surviving spouse . I..." d.
The marital deduction once was limited to the greater of $250,000 or 50 percent of the
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duction' 17 are two of the most significant deductions reducing the
gross estate value.
Another estate planning technique available to the artist is to
make gifts of his works during his lifetime." 8 Such a gift will pre-
clude further appreciation in the work from being included in the
artist's gross estate,119 and if the gift falls within certain statutory
limitations, it may not be subject to taxation at all.120  The artist
may also be able to set up a family partnership 21 or foundation.
1 22
value of the adjusted gross estate. Now, the deduction is unlimited. See Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 93-34, § 403(a)(1)(A), 95 Stat. 172, 301 (striking out subsection
(c) which contained this monetary limitation).
The marital deduction is only a deferral tax provision; the present deductions will eventu-
ally be taxed in the estate of the surviving spouse. See Crawford, supra note 101, at 180-81.
For a general discussion of the marital deduction, see Covey, Structuring and Funding
Marital Deduction Provisions--an Outline, 2 EsT. GIFrs & TR. J. 4 (1979).
117. I.R.C. § 2055 (1982). If an artwork is retained by the artist who created it and is
donated to a charitable organization by his estate, the deduction will be equal to the fair
market value of the item rather than the material cost, as would have been the case had the
artist donated it before he died.
In order to achieve maximum tax benefits, it was essential, prior to the Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981, to combine the marital and charitable deductions. Since the passage of
the Act, however, the unlimited marital deduction makes it unnecessary to use the charitable
deduction to reduce the federal estate tax to zero, if the decedent leaves the entire estate to
the spouse. Lerner, How to Coordinate Income and Estate Tax Savings of Donating a Collec-
tion to Charity, 11 EsT. PLAN. 147-48 (1984) [hereinafter Lerner, How to Coordinate].
In fact, the collection should be left to the surviving spouse even if the artist wants to
bequeath the entire collection to a charitable organization. The spouse would then donate the
works, garnering the normal § 170 deductions and avoiding federal estate taxes under the
unlimited marital deduction. The deceased artist, however, must be certain that his or her
spouse will, in fact, transfer the collection according to the artist's wishes. Id.
Several types of transfers qualify for the charitable deduction, but certain limitations can
be imposed. For a survey of these possibilities, see Bateman & Kligman, supra note 36, at 71;
see also Lerner, Final Sec. 2055(e)(4) Regs. May Result in Loss of Charity Deduction for
Artist's Estate, 62 J. TAX'N. 300 (1985) (discussing the section's impact on artists who be-
queath their works to charities and do not provide for the disposition of the copyright).
For a good discussion of copyrights as they pertain to the artist and his estate, see Schaaf,
supra note 105, at A-5 to A-13.
118. The artist must be careful in employing this technique since gifts made in anticipa-
tion of death will be included in the gross estate of the transferor. In fact, there arises a
rebuttable presumption that the transfer was made to accomplish a testamentary purpose if it
occurs within three years prior to death. See I.R.C. § 2035 (1982).
By making the gift, the taxpayer must give up possession of the item in order to receive
the tax benefits. Partial inter-vivos transfers are available, however, which allow the donor to
maintain possession but still receive the tax and estate planning benefits of a complete trans-
fer. See Lerner, How to Coordinate, supra note 117, at 146-47.
119. See Schaaf, supra note 105, at A-18.
120. I.R.C. § 2503(b), (c) (1982). The code allows every taxpayer to give up to $10,000
annually to any individual donee without having to pay a gift tax.
The possibility of a unified credit against gift tax also exists. See I.R.C. § 2505 (1982); see
also Speiller, supra note 61, at 247-48 & n.138 (discussing the credit).
121. For a complete discussion of this area, see Massey and O'Connell, Keeping it All in
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Furthermore, at least one state allows a credit against state estate
taxes by transferring ownership of some of the artist's artwork to
the state for exhibition in public institutions.2 3 Finally, if the artist
has the ability to forgo profits from the sale of his works during his
lifetime, his estate or beneficiaries can sell the property at poten-
tially significant tax savings after his death. 124
Besides the artist's ability to lessen his estate tax burden through
planning devices, the courts have offered their help by recognizing
the financial realities of the art market, as illustrated in Estate of
David Smith. '25 As a result of that case, the courts acknowledged
"blockage," a term referring to the inability of an estate to sell an
artist's collection because no market for the works exists.1 26 Previ-
ously, the estate would have been required to pay taxes based on
fair market value, regardless of how long it would take to disperse
the collection without depressing the market value. The court in
Smith, however, held that blockage may properly be considered in
valuing an artist's unsold works. 127 Now, the courts may determine
a fair dispersal time, and the estate pays taxes based on the present
value of that figure. 128
Congress also provided help for the illiquid market problem in
the Tax Reform Act of 1976.129 Whereas an estate normally has
only twelve months to pay its taxes, 130 it may be permitted to ex-
tend payment over a period of ten years upon a showing of reason-
able cause.13 1 The estate may also elect to delay the initial payment
the Family: Use of Family Partnerships and Section 704(b)(2) Special Allocations to Control
Estate Tax Valuation, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1980).
122. See, e.g., Harrow, Reflections, supra note 113, at 580-83.
123. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 93(1) (Supp. 1985).
124. I.R.C. § 1014(a) steps up the basis in property acquired from a decedent. Thus, gain
or loss on subsequent sales or exchanges will be determined according to this higher basis,
and any appreciation in the work which occurred prior to death will never be taxed. See
Schaaf, supra note 108, at 2.
125. See supra note 105.
126. The estate might be put into this forced sale situation in order to raise the money to
pay off estate tax obligations. See Lyons, Tax Breaks for Artists' Heirs, VI ART & THE LAW
24 (1980).
127. Estate of David Smith, supra note 105, at 445.
128. The Tax Court considered the element of blockage in the case of Alexander Calder's
widow, allowing disposition periods of 18 to 22 years and discount rates of 18% to 25%.
Louisa J. Calder v. Commissioner, 85 TAX Cr. REP. (CCH) 42, 467 (1985).
129. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2004, 90 Stat. 1520, 1862 (1976).
130. I.R.C. § 6161(a)(1) (1982). "The Secretary... may extend the time for payment...
for a reasonable period not to exceed ... 12 months ... from the date fixed for payment
thereof." Id.
131. Id. § 6161(a)(2) "The Secretary may, for reasonable cause, extend the time for pay-
ment of [estate taxes] for a reasonable period not in excess of 10 years." Id See also Id
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for up to five years. 13 2
Thus, although artists may offer strong arguments in favor of
changing estate tax valuation of their creative works from fair mar-
ket value to material cost, 33 the hardships threatening the estate
can be greatly minimized with careful estate planning. This, com-
bined with the presence of horizontal equity, makes a change in our
estate law unnecessary. The solution to the problem of inequitable
treatment of artist donations does not lie in the estate tax area but in
changing the income tax laws themselves.
B. Modification of Income Tax Laws
One of the primary catalysts behind the amendment of Internal
Revenue Code section 170(e) by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was
the need to combat the problem of government officials' donation of
their papers, 3g but Congress went too far.135 The changes which
prevented politicians from abusing the system handicapped the art-
ist, yet left the collector virtually unaffected.' 36 Valuation abuses
were just as extensive among collectors as they were among artists
prior to the changes. 137 Furthermore, the ability to profit more by
donating an item than by selling it applied equally to both the col-
lector and the artist. 3 Now that these problems have been ad-
dressed,' 39 it is necessary to bring equity to the situation by
changing the income tax laws.'"
One of the general goals of our tax code is to ensure equal treat-
ment of similarly situated taxpayers' 4 ' through application of the
§ 6166 (for reasonable cause, the Secretary can extend payment of estate taxes for 10 years
when the estate consists largely of an interest in a closely held business).
132. See id § 6166(3). If an election is made under section 6166, the estate can delay the
first installment for five years, although interest charges may apply.
133. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
134. 119 CONG. REc. 9400 (1973) (statement of Senator Frank Church).
135. Id
136. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
137. See Turner Interview, supra note 78.
138. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. That example also applies to the collec-
tor. Assume the collector purchased the painting for $100, which becomes his adjusted basis.
The numbers once again prove that the collector benefits more by donating than by selling
the item.
139. See supra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
140. "It would appear that such unequal treatment could be viewed as a violation of the
fundamental concept of equal treatment under the law. There would seem to be no mitigat-
ing factors that differentiate between the two groups of donors and which would justify differ-
ent methods of tax evaluation." 1981 Hearings, supra note 80, at 349 (statement of American
Arts Alliance).
141. See, eag., Pechman, supra note 19, at 70.
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"horizontal equity" principle.142 The application of the principle in
the donation of artwork situation dictates that "[c]ontributions of
creative compositions by creators or collectors should be treated as
similarly as possible, irrespective of the difference in which the con-
tributed compositions were acquired." 14 3 This was the case prior to
the Tax Reform Act of 1969,'" but since that enactment, collectors
may take a fair market value deduction while only a material cost
deduction is allowed to artists."4 5 Equity dictates a reversion to the
former valuation method to ensure that individuals with compara-
ble incomes who donate equally valued property receive comparable
tax treatment.
146
Those who oppose this income tax change argue that while eq-
uity is desirable, the present treatment is justified since the artist's
and collector's investments in the work are different and thus they
are not similarly situated. 47 According to this line of reasoning,
the collector is using after-tax income to buy the art, and thus he is
entitled to capital gains benefits' 48 and a charitable deduction at fair
market value.'49 The artist, on the other hand, is not entitled to the
capital gains treatment on artwork that he has created. 15 ° Any
charitable contribution of his work is determined by his adjusted
basis in that item, which is essentially his material cost. 15 1 Basi-
cally, the difference between the artist's cost and the fair market
value reflects his personal efforts; under this line of reasoning, a
charitable contribution of an artist's work is thus analogous to a
donation of his services. 152 Just as a doctor or lawyer doing pro
bono work could not deduct the value of time spent volunteering,153
an artist should not be allowed to deduct the value of his labor.'
54
142. Id.
143. Note, Tax Treatment, supra note 20, at 161. Efficiency considerations also dictate
similar treatment of the two groups, "for fear that the creator may be influenced to devote
fewer of his resources to holding personally created property and more to collecting, or in-
vesting, than would be optimal." Id.
144. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
146. Note, Tax Treatment, supra note 20, at 162.
147. See Feld, supra note 24, at 625.
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
152. Note, Tax Incentives, supra note 20, at 711.
153. "No deduction is allowable under section 170 for a contribution of services."
TREAS. REG. § 1.170A-l(g) (1979).
154. Since the value of the creative part of an artist's work is totally due to his labor,
there should not be a deduction allowed for his labor. L. DUBOFF, supra note 17, at 650.
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One may rebut these arguments by first illustrating the differ-
ence between a doctor and an artist providing services to charity.
First, while the artist's services are encompassed in a tangible gift
which can be objectively valued, the services of the doctor are much
more difficult to value.155 Second, it is possible to consider the crea-
tor's own work as capital gain property instead of ordinary income
property.1 56  This type of treatment is not foreign to our tax code.
The inventions of amateur inventors are afforded capital asset treat-
ment,15 7 as are the patents secured by both professionals and ama-
teurs.158  These groups are given capital gains treatment because
Congress recognizes the value of their inventions to society and
wants to promote their continuing creativity. 59 But art, too, pro-
vides comparable societal benefits and thus should be accorded
equal tax treatment.
One of the driving forces behind the 1969 changes seems to be
the fear of artists "painting a deduction" at income tax time.1 60
This concept entailed an artist discovering at year end that he
needed a deduction to offset income. He would then quickly pro-
duce a painting, donate it to a museum, and realize the tax savings.
The occurrence of this scenario, however, is not the problem that
some politicians believe it to be. 161
155. One reason for disallowing a deduction for the donation of services is the adminis-
trative difficulty of accurately and equitably measuring the value of those services. With the
artist and his artwork, this obstacle can be overcome, since the artist's services are embodied
in tangible personal property having an ascertainable market value. See 1973 Hearings, supra
note 48, at 6143-44 (testimony of Richard E. Oldenburg, Director, Museum of Modem Art,
New York).
156. This classification could be accomplished by allowing an artist to hold his work as
an investment. Under that approach, any gain on the sale of the item would be considered
capital gain; thus, charitable contribution of the work could also be deducted at fair market
value. For a manner in which to accomplish this investment characterization, see infra notes
204-06 and accompanying text.
157. The amateur inventor escaped the wrath of the Revenue Act of 1950. See supra note
27. This is the act which prohibited capital asset treatment for an artist's own creation.
158. See I.R.C. § 1235 (1982). "A transfer ... of property consisting of all substantial
rights to a patent ... by any holder shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset
held for more than 1 year .... For purposes of this section, the term "holder" means any
individual whose efforts created such property ...... Id.
159. As originally enacted by the House of Representatives, the § 1221(3) exception in-
cluded amateur inventors. The Senate rejected this part of the bill, stating that "[y]our com-
mittee believes that the desirability of fostering the work of inventors outweighs the small
amount of additional revenue which might be obtained under the House bill, and therefore
the words 'inventions,' 'patent,' and 'design' have been eliminated." S. REP. No. 2375, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1950).
160. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 48, at 6082 (statement of Ralph F. Colin, Administra-
tive Vice President and Counsel, Art Dealers Association of America, Inc.).
161. This concern has been addressed in recently proposed legislation. See The National
1987]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The notion that an artist can quickly paint up a tax deduction
has been dispelled by a recent survey, which showed a wide range of
museum policies with regard to accepting gifts or bequests of art.162
The results revealed that museum directors were highly selective in
the works they accepted for their institutions. A donation might be
rejected for the obvious reason that it does not meet the standards
of the museum,163 or that the maintenance and display costs associ-
ated with receipt of the gift are prohibitive."
Just as museums will not accept all gifts, most artists will not
donate their works to just any museum.1 65 Artists take pride in
their creations and are sensitive to public perception of their efforts.
Before the creator makes a donation, he must be assured that the
method of display, lighting, and maintenance will be handled ac-
cording to his specifications.' 66
Heritage Resources Act, H.R. 3087, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. E3564 (daily ed.
July 26, 1985), requiring that all property for which deductions are taken must be in exist-
ence for one year prior to its donation, preventing the quick production and donation of
property at tax time.
162. Vencel & Whitman, Giving Art to Museums: Special Considerations for the Estate
Planner, 122 TR. & EsT. 35, 35-37 (1983). The surveyed museums were the San Francisco
Fine Arts Museum, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City, the Mattatick Mu-
seum in Waterbury, Connecticut, and the William Benton Museum of the University of
Connecticut.
163. Id. A museum might not accept a work outside of its realm. For example, a mu-
seum specializing in southwestern art might not accept a work in the French impressionist
style. But see Speiller, supra note 61, at 232 (asserting that museums are not selective).
164. Museums have been forced to become much more cost conscious as the costs of
storage, insurance, security, and preservation increase. Vencel & Whitman, supra note 162,
at 35, 37.
165. But see Turner Interview, supra note 78 (While established artists are selective in the
museum to which they will make a donation, newer artists are not. They will readily sacrifice
the sale of a work to have it accepted by a museum; the subsequent prestige and increased
earning potential will more than compensate them for this present loss of sale revenue.).
166. See Harrow, Reflections, supra note 113, at 573, 582. The author discusses artist
Mark Rothko's intense concern for the display of his art and its perception by society.
Rothko wrote:
A picture lives by companionship, expanding and quickening in the eyes of the
sensitive observer. It dies by the same token. It is, therefore, a risky and unfeeling
act to send it out into the world. How often it must be permanently impaired by the
eyes of the vulgar and crnelty of the impotent who would extend their affliction
universally!
Id. at 573.
Rothko's daughter discussed her father's concern:
My father was always deeply concerned with the fate of his paintings, how and
to whom they would be disposed of, the conditions in which they were seen or
exhibited and the environments in which they were placed. This deep concern, over
the span of his artistic life, caused him to be reluctant to sell his paintings, very
cautious as to whom they were sold, and extremely concerned about the way they
were exhibited.
Id. at 582-83.
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Another argument in favor of changing the income tax laws is to
encourage more efficient use of assets. As the tax laws stand now,
the only way an artist can receive a fair market deduction for the
donation of his work is for his estate to make the donation after his
death.167 A change in the income tax laws would allow the work to
be put to more efficient use while the artist is still alive, rather than
languishing in the artist's studio for what could be many years,
awaiting his death and the subsequent beneficial tax treatment.1 68
A final argument for income tax law changes has been presented
by the executive branch of the government. When President Rea-
gan realized the need to stimulate private support for the arts, he
organized the Presidential Task Force on the Arts and Humanities
to examine this area.1 69 The Task Force's report recommended the
following change to the tax code: creators of works of art should
receive "'the same tax treatment, as a result of the charitable con-
tribution of their work, available to a collector or other donor giv-
ing a purchased work or manuscript.' "170
Even though recommendations for changing the income tax
laws have received support from the executive branch itself, there
are still those who feel change is unnecessary. They assert that al-
lowing artists a fair market value deduction for the donation of
their artwork is just a loophole for the rich.1 71 It hardly seems equi-
table, however, to penalize the artist and his gift of appreciated
property when potential abuses obtain in other areas of the sys-
tem.1 72 For example, tax shelters in oil and gas, real estate, and
equipment leasing all lend themselves to abuse. 173 Although tax
shelters have come under close scrutiny,17 their primary purpose-
encouraging certain activities beneficial to the economy-can be
167. See supra notes 36 & 117 and accompanying text.
168. But see supra note 37.
169. See Exec. Order No. 12,308, 46 Fed. Reg. 30,485 (1981).
170. 1981 Hearings, supra note 80, at 354 (statement of American Association of
Museums).
171. Kinsley, The Art of Deduction: Witer's Loophole, Wall St. J., Mar. 11, 1983, at 27,
col. 1 (since the artist is not taxed on the worth of his art unless he sells it, he should not be
allowed a fair market value deduction upon donation).
172. Note, Tax Incentives, supra note 20, at 687.
173. See Hershey, The Boom in Tax Shelters, N.Y. Times July 19, 1983, at DI, col. 3.
Tax shelters are "investment devices designed to shelter income from taxation, usually for a
period of years." Id
174. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 severely limits the amount of losses that a taxpayer can
deduct if he is technically not at risk. Furthermore, a passive relationship with the shelter
can substantially reduce its tax benefits. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 70, at -
(codified at I.R.C. § 469 (1986)).
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upheld. 175
Income tax law changes, as applied to the artist, would have a
similar effect of encouraging favorable activities. 176 Permitting art-
ists a charitable contribution deduction 177 of fair market value
could be considered a recognition of quality and, at the same time,
an inducement for them to donate their works for the benefit of
society. 178 In other countries, the government provides this incen-
tive for artists by either completely or partially exempting them
from income tax or allowing them to credit charitable contributions
of their work against tax liabilities.1 79  While this Note does not
advocate such radical measures, some change in our income tax
laws is needed to bring about the desired results.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
While bills have been proposed to alter the negative effects of the
1969 tax changes, none has been able to garner the support neces-
sary for passage.'8 ° The proposals have ranged from restoring the
artist to the position he held before the passage of the Act to provid-
ing a credit against the donating artist's income tax.18 ' Even
though every proposal contained provisions to eliminate abuses, 18 2
each has died in committee.
The proposed National Heritage Resources Act is the most re-
cent attempt to alter this area of the law.'8 3 Introduced in July of
1985, the bill proposes income tax changes which would provide
175. Hershey, supra note 173, at D6, col. 3.
176. "There is no question that [charitable donation deductions] benefit the rich, as do a
lot of other provisions in the tax code.. ., [b]ut what you're doing is giving an incentive to
affluent people to give works of art to museums so that the general public receives the bene-
fits." ARTNEws, supra note 75, at 25 (quoting Gilbert Edelson, Secretary-Treasurer of the
Art Dealers Association of America).
177. Artists would still be limited to the charitable contribution limitations of I.R.C.
§ 170(b)(I)(A).
178. Note, Tax Incentives, supra note 20, at 711.
179. 1973 Hearings, supra note 48, at 6117, 6120 (statement of Elias Newman).
180. Renato Beghe seems to blame the lack of support on the furor that still exists in
Congress over the Nixon papers deduction fiasco. See Beghe, supra note 21, at 516.
181. See, e.g., S. 852, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (would allow an income tax credit for
contributions of self-created compositions based on the greater of $2500 or one-half of the
taxpayer's total income tax for the year).
182. Provisions in the previously proposed bills are similar to those incorporated into
H.R. 3087. See supra note 182; infra notes 185-87.
183. See Resources Act, supra note 161. The bill was introduced by Congressman
Thomas J. Downey of New York and was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.
While the bill died at the close of the 99th Congress, Congressman Downey is almost certain
to reintroduce it in the 100th Congress. Telephone conversation with Dan Horwitz, Assis-
tant to Congressman Thomas T. Downey (Dec. 19, 1986).
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living artists with a fair market value charitable contribution deduc-
tion for the donation of their works to cultural institutions. 184 Spe-
cific stipulations have been included to prevent deductions for
quickly produced works of art.185 The donated item must also be
directly related to the primary purpose of the accepting institu-
tion, 86 and no deduction may be taken by an official of the federal
government if the work was produced during his term in office. 18 7
While the bill requires a statement from the donee that it will
use the property for its tax-exempt purpose,1 88 the bill should also
compel the accepting organization to vouch for the work's value.
Such a requirement would deter falsification, because museums,
which strive to protect their prestigious reputations, could be held
liable for misrepresenting the value of donated works. 189 A further
safeguard against abuse would be to require institutions to insure
contributed items for the amount the institution claims they are
worth. The higher the value a museum assigns to a piece, the more
it will cost in insurance premiums. Because the museum's interests
are diametrically opposed to those of the artist, who seeks a higher
appraisal for deduction purposes, a system of checks and balances
against abuse would result.190
Ironically, an essential part of these proposals already exists.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969, which amended Internal Revenue
184. The language of the Act states that "[s]ubsection (e) of section 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954... is amended by adding ... that in the case of a qualified artistic
charitable contribution... the amount of such contribution shall be the fair market value of
the property contributed." H.R. 3087, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1985).
185. The donated work must be "created by the personal efforts of the taxpayer making
such contribution no less than 1 year prior to such contribution." Iad
186. The charitable contribution applies only if "the use of such property by the donee is
related to the purpose or function constituting the basis for the donees exemption under
section 501 ... ." Id
187. The deduction does not apply "in the case of any charitable contribution of any
letter, [or] memorandum... which was written, prepared, or produced by or for an individ-
ual while such individual was an officer or employee of the United States .... " Id
The legislative retrictions also include appraisal requirements, deduction limitations (the
amount cannot exceed the taxpayer's gross income from artistry for that year), and stipula-
tions against using the deduction in computing the minimum tax. Id
188. "The taxpayer [must receive] ... from the donee a written statement representing
that the donee's use of the property will be in accordance with [its section 501 purpose]." Id
189. See Turner Interview, supra note 78. Dr. Turner indicated that museums them-
selves could be liable if they vouch for inaccurate appraisals.
190. But see Turner Interview, supra note 78. The problem with this type of requirement
is that museums do not insure each individual work of art. Instead, museums determine,
based on conjecture, the maximum loss potential from a single tragedy. They insure for this
amount, which is considerably below the value of the collection in toto. To insure each piece
individually would be prohibitively expensive.
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Code section 170(e), also instituted the related use restriction,191
which would have prevented many abusive charitable deduction
ploys without the section 170(e) changes and their harsh conse-
quences to the artist. 92 Before the provision went into effect, artists
seeking deductions found that charitable organizations such as
churches, hospitals, universities, and the like were convenient
dumping grounds for their works.193 These organizations were in-
discriminate in what they accepted, since their intention was to real-
ize a cash gain by selling the works, frequently at a price below the
artists' claimed deductions.1 94 They often were unconcerned with
the value artists placed on their works, and once the pieces were
sold in "distress" sales, the IRS was unable to prove that the artists'
deductions were not valid.1 95
The related use restriction prevents this practice by providing
that if the donated item is not related to the donee's tax-exempt
purpose, then the taxpayer must reduce his deduction by the appre-
ciated value of the item.'96 In other words, the artist is placed in
the same position as if he had sold the item, recognized the gain,
and then donated the proceeds to the institution-he receives no tax
benefit for making this donation. The related use provision thus
serves to remove the incentive for artists to give to non-related
organizations.
The proposed National Heritage Resources Act and its fair mar-
ket value deductions for artists1 97 appears to achieve the sought-
after results: tax treatment of the artist consistent with other tax-
payers in the same situation; incentive for the artist to donate self-
created work to appropriate museums; and protections against sys-
tem abuse. Furthermore, the bill would accomplish all this without
191. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a)(1)(B), 83 Stat. 487, 549
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i)).
192. This restriction makes the related use provision in the National Heritage Resources
Act superfluous. See supra note 186.
193. See Turner Interview, supra note 78.
194. Note, Tax Incentives, supra note 20, at 677.
195. Id. Since the organizations characterized their actions as "distress" sales, i.e., sell-
ing the piece for whatever price obtainable due to a need for money, the IRS could not use the
sale price as a factor in verifying the artist's deduction.
196.
"The amount of any charitable contribution of... tangible personal property, if the
use by the donee is unrelated to the purpose or function constituting the basis for its
exemption under section 501 ... [shall be reduced by] the amount of gain which
would have been long-term capital gain if the property contributed had been sold by
the taxpayer at its fair market value.
I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i) (1986).
197. See supra note 184.
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significant revenue loss to the Treasury.198
While the National Heritage Resources Act199 is theoretically a
step in the right direction, critics might oppose the bill on the
ground that it allows artists a deduction for their services, while
other professionals are not afforded such a benefit."c° This practice,
however, does not differ from the treatment artists received before
1969, when they were allowed fair market value deductions for
charitable donations," 1 which included the service component.
Before the deduction provision was changed, the issue of allowing
artists to deduct the value of their donated services was not a source
of contention. Congress had several concerns which led to the Tax
Reform Act of 1969,202 but the "services" issue was not one of
them. Furthermore, patent holders and amateur inventors are al-
lowed fair market value deductions for what arguably are their serv-
ices.203 Thus, a return to a fair market value deduction for artists
has its precedents.
If, however, Congress adopts the purist's position of strict ad-
herence to disallowing a personal services deduction, this Note
would propose the following: allow the artist the option of paying
taxes on the personal services portion of his work (essentially, fair
market value minus material costs) in the year it is completed. 2 4
At that point, the artist would be viewed as an investor in his own
work. Any subsequent gain or loss, computed from the new in-
creased adjusted basis, would be given capital treatment since the
work would no longer fall under the section 1221(3) exception. 05
In other words, the creation is now a capital asset and no longer
ordinary income property. After one year, the artist could donate
the work to a charitable organization, deducting fair market value
in the same manner as any other collector.20 6
This proposal might be objected to on the grounds that it pro-
vides a temptation for an artist to value his work too low initially.
198. See supra note 96.
199. See supra note 161.
200. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
204. See Feld, supra note 24, at 658. Professor Feld advocates a similar approach which
would allow the artist to treat the work as if he sold it immediately after completion.
205. Id.
206. Id An additional benefit from this type of election would be the artist's ability to
fall within I.R.C. § 1031 since he would, by statute, be holding the art for investment pur-
poses. Under § 1031, he would not pay any additional tax if he exchanged like-kind property.
Feld, supra note 24, at 658.
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He would thereby pay less taxes up front, thus increasing both his
capital gains and, as a result, his contribution deduction poten-
tial.20 7 This possibility is always a factor, but an artist must still
meet substantiation requirements2"8 and is subject to IRS audit.20 9
Additionally, one scholar has suggested that by requiring an artist
to offer his work for sale at his stated value, any abusive lure would
be nullified by the fear of losing the piece at too low a price.210
The above proposal to allow an artist to be treated as an investor
seems a fair and equitable way to accomplish the goals of the Na-
tional Heritage Resources Act.21 ' While the artist might not benefit
to the same extent as if the Act were enacted as written, since he
will be required to recognize gain on the personal service portion of
his creation, horizontal equity would nevertheless be achieved. In
either case- whether returning to the fair market value deduction
for donations or providing the artist with an opportunity to obtain
investor status in the artwork-the artist would now be treated, for
tax purposes, like any collector who has made a charitable contribu-
tion of art. The injustices created by the Tax Reform Act of 1969
would thus be alleviated.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 changed the amount artists could
deduct for the donation of their self-created works from fair market
value to material costs. This was a gross injustice, because horizon-
tal equity, one of the goals of the Internal Revenue Code, was dis-
turbed. The tax treatment of the artist was no longer consistent
with that of the collector, who was still permitted to deduct fair
market value for donations, nor was it compatible with the artist's
collection being assessed at fair market value for estate tax
purposes.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 658-59 for methods the IRS could use to verify the value.
209. See I.R.C. §§ 7601-7602 (1982).
210. Feld, supra note 24, at 659. Feld also counters the argument that any subsequent
gain should be characterized as inventory-type gain rather than capital, and thus treated as
ordinary income pursuant to I.R.C. § 1221. Feld contends that since the service component
is included in income and the artist is required to retain the work for more than one year
before getting beneficial treatment, the inventory classification is illogical. Feld, supra note
24, at 659.
211. An inequity that will remain, however, is that once the artist makes the election and
pays taxes on the service portion of his work, he is then locked into this investment classifica-
tion. In the future, if he decides that he does not desire to sell or donate the painting, he will
be forced to adhere to this earlier decision, thereby paying taxes on a gain he normally would
not have been required to pay.
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The artists' response to the tax changes has been to stop donat-
ing their works to museums and cultural institutions, instead selling
that art to private collections, many of which are in other countries.
Such dispersal will seriously hamper future scholarship on contem-
porary American artists.2 12 Moreover, the nation itself will be de-
prived of its cultural heritage.
The catalyst for the 1969 tax amendment seemed to originate
with President Nixon's large deduction for the donation of his vice
presidential papers. The more basic concerns, however, were valua-
tion abuse and the possibility of artists benefiting more by donating
their work than by selling it. Additionally, some legislators seemed
to feel that increased government funding of the arts justified the
reduction in private sector incentives to support our cultural
organizations.
It is no longer more profitable to donate a self-generated item
than to sell it, however, and valuation techniques have become
more sophisticated and more closely regulated. Furthermore, pro-
posed bills contain restrictions to preclude the recurrence of past
abuses. Finally, the federal government has cut back severely on
government funding of the arts. Thus, the need for changes in the
tax laws to restore incentives for artist donations is ever more
pressing.
One possible solution is to change the estate tax laws to provide
that an artist's collection is valued at material cost, consistent with
the value applied when the artist donates the item. Although some
artists feel the estate tax laws themselves are the source of the prob-
lem, their estates are nevertheless treated like those of other taxpay-
ers, a fact which cuts against the argument for a change in the estate
tax laws. In addition, many planning strategies are available to alle-
viate a high tax bill and the subsequent burdens it would place on
the artist's heirs.
The change, therefore, must take place in our income tax laws in
order to allow artists to deduct fair market value for the donation of
their self-created works. If critics strongly object to the concept of
allowing artists a deduction for their services, a viable alternative
exists whereby an artist would be permitted to pay taxes based on
the personal service portion of his work immediately after comple-
tion of a creation. Any appreciation in the value of the artwork
after this time would be capital gain and thus entitled to a fair mar-
ket deduction upon donation to a qualified museum. In either case,
212. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 80, at 317 (statement of Daniel Boorstin).
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horizontal equity would be restored, since the artist would be
treated in the same manner as the collector who donates an identi-
cal piece. Not only will tax symmetry be achieved, but the incentive
for artists to donate their work will be enhanced as well.
The accrued benefits from the proposed change would be imme-
diate as well as long-lasting. Museums and libraries would once
again be able to make major acquisitions without cost, artists would
be able to donate their work to museums where it will best be dis-
played and maintained, and, most importantly, the presence of
these important works of art in our museums will preserve
America's cultural heritage for present and future generations to
enjoy. 213
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213. Id. at 317-18.
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